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Abstract. With the growing use and financial importance of the In-
ternet, cyber criminals increasingly perceive computer systems, network
architectures, and databases storing transaction- and personal-related
data as assets and profitable targets. As illicit activities have become
more organized and monetary-driven, a digital underground economy
for hacking-related goods and services has evolved. In this paper, we
outline the infrastructure and modes of operation of said economy with
the help of real world samples captured in a communication channel on
an IRC network. Thereby, we are able to gain a better understanding of
the dynamics and interactions on this market.
1 Introduction
With an estimated number of 1.7 billion users and more than 206 million active
sites, the Internet has evolved to one of the major information and communi-
cation platforms [16, 19]. With the growing acceptance of online trading and
banking platforms, the commercial role of the World Wide Web has augmented
as well: According to a recent Nielsen survey, 86% of the Internet population
have ordered goods online at least once [20]. In the U.S. alone, retail sales in
electronic commerce have climbed up to almost $127 billion [28]. The rapid eco-
nomic growth has, however, also been accompanied by the evolution of a digital
underground economy [6, 9, 27]. In special chat rooms and Internet forums, cy-
ber criminals happily trade and abuse stolen credit card data, turning the once
popular slogan “I’d like to pay with my Visa card” from a TV commercial in
the 1990s into the opposite. Other transaction- and financially-related informa-
tion such as login credentials for online bank accounts or shipping and delivery
addresses containing personal data are frequently offered and requested as well.
The extent of these activities has moved to a “point where it exceeds the capac-
ity of a closed group” [6] and caught broad attention in both the popular and
academic press more recently [6, 7, 9, 25–27].
21.1 Previous Work
A first insight into this economy was given by members of the Honeynet Project.
By monitoring several communication channels on an IRC (Internet Relay Chat)
network, they successfully discovered some type of automated credit card fraud
[10]. Thomas and Martin analyzed the relationship between different market
participants and tried to estimate the value of the economy [27]. The first ex-
tensive empirical study was presented by Franklin et al. [6]. With the help of
machine learning algorithms, the authors categorized a data set of more than 13
million messages and identified a myriad of goods and services that are traded
on the market. The results of a similar large-scale investigation were published
by Symantec [25, 26]. In addition, various other researchers focused on special
phenomena of the underground economy: Holz et al. attempted to assess the ac-
tual amount of the traded goods and services by examining captured keylogger
data [9]. The physical and monetary effects of a spam network were observed by
Kanich et al. [12]. Finally, Cova et al. investigated several identify theft-related
toolkits that are offered in diverse channels of the IRC network [3].
1.2 Contributions
In accordance with prior work [6, 25, 32], we have monitored a branch of the
underground economy over a period of 2 1/2 months and performed a brief
quantitative evaluation. Our main focus, however, was to give a more qualitative
description of this activity since the quantitative nature of previous studies usu-
ally leaves the behavior of the involved miscreants rather abstract to outsiders
and non-security professionals. Therefore, we illustrate the interactions between
the different participants on the basis of actual messages captured in the market.
We feel that a presentation of real world examples can help develop a better un-
derstanding of the economy and perceive its participants as a community with
their own interests, anxieties, and socio-cultural characteristics such as their own
jargon and slang. Note that we have only analyzed market activity on an IRC
network for this task. Other trading platforms of the underground economy such
as online forums or malicious websites were not taken into consideration.
1.3 Outline of the Paper
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows: In Section 2, we briefly il-
lustrate the mode of operation of the IRC network that forms one of the bases
of the underground economy. An overview of the data that we recorded in the
course of the observation period in one IRC channel as well as our data acqui-
sition technique is presented in Section 3, followed by a thorough description
and analysis of the collected information in Section 4. The extent of the trading
activity as well as particular characteristics of the market and its participants
are shortly described in Section 5. We conclude with a summary of our findings
and indicate opportunities for future work in Section 6.
32 Brief Background on IRC
The Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol provides a mechanism for real-time text
communication over the Internet based on the client-server model [21]. Users
typically log on to an IRC server with the help of a client application such as
mIRC [17] or XChat [31]. Once a client has established a working connection,
the user chooses a unique nickname (nick) for identification purposes and joins
a so-called channel to start interacting with other participants. Messages can
be either sent in the open and are broadcasted to all other channel members or
be exchanged on a one-to-one basis in a private manner. In the latter case, the
communication is not even accessible to the channel operator, a special user who
possesses administrative and maintenance privileges, e.g., for specifying the topic
of the discussion or removing (kicking) misbehaving users out of the channel.
Many of these operations can be automated to a great extent and are frequently
assigned to so-called bots [14], i.e., independently-running software programs. To
enhance the security of a channel, operators may also define certain access rules.
For instance, by setting a channel password (keyword) or making the channel
invite-only, join operations can be easily restricted to a closed group.
3 Data Acquisition
3.1 Recording IRC Data with Compromised Honeypots
Over a period of about 10 weeks, from April 20, 2008 to June 30, 2008, we have
monitored the channel #ccpower on the Undernet IRC network and recorded
more than 676,000 messages. Access to the channel was obtained with the help
of a compromised honeypot. A honeypot is “an information system resource
whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of this resource” [23, 24] and is
intentionally designed to be probed and attacked. Being bound to a number of
network- as well as system-monitoring devices, a honeypot serves as an electronic
bait and may help learn more about the behavior and characteristics of Internet
miscreants [11, 22]. In our case, we were able to watch an adversary set up an
IRC proxy (bouncer) and bot software on our system in order to take part in the
trading activities of the underground economy. As the presence of the honeypot
was not detected by the cyber criminal, all her actions as well as all public
occurrences in the channel could be silently logged. We thus acted as a classic
man-in-the-middle (MITM) between the system of the attacker and the IRC
network (see Figure 1). More information about the approach can be found in
the thesis by Vo¨mel [29].
To date, a great part of the communication facilities of the underground
economy can still be joined without difficulty [27]. However, current observation
techniques are quickly rendered useless once miscreants start to limit access to
a channel and cover their operations more carefully. In this case, a compromised
honeypot may prove useful for maintaining an open door, assuming the presence
of a monitored environment slips by the attacker. In the past, security profes-
sionals succeeded in disclosing covert actions with similar architectures [11,22].
4Fig. 1: Setup of the Data Acquisition Architecture
3.2 Overview of the Collected Data
To a high degree, the recorded text corpora consisted of repetitively-sent mes-
sages. In many cases, automated scripts and programs periodically retransmitted
pre-defined lines of text, for instance, advertisements for specific goods and ser-
vices that are offered in the economy. For this reason, our data set of more than
676,000 collected messages could be reduced to a comparatively small working
set of 4,165 unique posts, ordered according to their frequency. We manually cat-
egorized and labeled 10% (417) of the most frequent messages in the next step
to accurately assess the recorded communication. Due to the characteristics of
the frequency distribution, the labeled messages already covered 84.5% of the
text corpora and were used as training data for a binary text classifier. Thereby,
we were able to apply statistical machine learning techniques and automatically
associate each of the more than 676,000 posts with a meaningful descriptor.
Similar automatic text classification approaches were also used by several other
authors in the past to process large quantities of captured IRC data [4, 6].
We outline the results of our research in the next section. Unless otherwise
stated, our analysis is based on the labeled data.
4 Illustration of Illicit Activities in the Channel
All labeled messages were identified as either advertisements or requests for
various cybercrime-related goods and services. The respective offers comprised
about three quarters of the data set and outnumbered requests almost five to one.
In addition, we assigned each message to one or more non-mutually distinctive
categories in order to thoroughly classify the different data samples. In sum, we
distinguished 10 categories as shown in Figure 2, namely offers and requests for
(1) credit card-related data, (2) money transfer (cash out) operations, (3) hacked
hosts, (4) online bank and (5) business accounts, (6) personal data, including
addresses and phone numbers of the victims, (7) spam, (8) hacking, and phishing
campaigns, (9) special hardware equipment that is required to carry out the
5operations, and finally, (10) so-called confirmers who act as intermediaries and
verify the legitimacy of a business deal. We illustrate these categories in more
detail in the following and present examples of real world messages that we have
captured during the observation period.
Fig. 2: Types of Hacking-Related Goods and Services
4.1 Credit Card-Related Offers and Requests
In almost 4 out of 10 cases, adversaries posted advertisements for stolen credit
cards and credit card-related information. As McCarty [15, p. 91] points out, the
data may either be obtained by breaking into computer systems and corporate
databases or be physically provided by morally questionable personnel working
at local banks, hotels, or restaurants (see also Line 7 of Listing 1).
Oftentimes, miscreants stated to possess both the personal identification
number (PIN) of the victim as well as her card verification value (CVV2). The
latter is a three-digit identification code that is frequently used for verifying the
legitimacy of a credit card during online transactions. Some typical advertise-
ments that we have captured during the observation period are shown in the
upper half of Listing 1.
Prices for credit cards varied between $2 and $8 per piece. In many cases,
the attackers also offered product bundles: In the example shown in Listing 1
(Line 13), 30 newly acquired (“fresh”) cards (“CCz”) were advertised for $200.
Corresponding requests were found in only 13.25% of the data set. Several rep-
6resentative sample messages for this category are displayed in the lower half of
Listing 1.
1 # Adver t i s ements f o r Cred i t Cards and Cred i t Card−Re la t ed
# Informat ion
"Selling valid fresh unused Mastercards/Visa/American
Express (...)"
6
"Fresh Lists. Selling hacked admin shop & hotel database.
DUMPS , FULLS , CVV2 , TRACK2. 101 Skimmed only. (...)"
"SELLING SKIMMED DUMPS WITH PIN FROM GAS STATION!
11 FOR BAD DUMPS; MONEY BACK AND REPLACE GUARANTEE! (...)"
"Selling Fresh France CCz With Cvv2 (...) 30ccz = 200$ (...)"
"Selling USA/Worldwide VISA/MC dumps from Bulgarian and
16 Russian suppliers. Frum first hands! (...)"
"CVV2 FRESH IS HERE * * * 5,000 CVV2 FRESH IN HAND!
200 FRESH DAILY! (...)"
21
# Reques t s f o r Cred i t Cards and Cred i t Card−Re la t ed
# Informat ion
"Buying all valid cc ’s Visa or Mastercard 7$ Each ! (...)"
26
"MY BINLIST : http ://<... >/ bnss.txt - any card for 250$ !!!
msg me if u have any !"
"I need cvv2 From Italy , Who have privat me (...)"
31
"NEED CVV2 SUPPLIER TO SUPPLY US AND NON US CVV AND WORK IN
LONG TERM .... PLS PM ME FOR GOD DEALZ YM:<...> @YAHOO.COM"
Listing 1: Sample Advertisements and Requests for Stolen Credit Cards and
Credit Card-Related Information
4.2 Cash Out-Related Offers and Requests
One of the biggest challenges Internet miscreants face is to safely cash the il-
legally obtained funds while mitigating the risk of getting caught by law en-
forcement authorities at the same time [27]. For this reason, attackers frequently
cooperate with so-called cashiers, i.e., brokers who are willing to clean out the
7bank accounts of the victims. For a pre-defined, fixed fee (e.g., 50% of the to-
tal amount) the cashier transfers the money directly to the adversary, typically
within hours, by using online or oﬄine services as offered by Western Union
(WU) or E-Gold (see also Franklin et al. [6]).
Alternatively, the money may temporarily be moved to a drop, i.e., an in-
termediary domestic or offshore account, that helps impede prosecution and
facilitates money laundering [27, p. 11-12]. In this case, so-called confirmers are
frequently hired and act as trusted third parties to verify incoming payments. A
list of selected advertisements and requests for cashiers, confirmers, and drops
can be found in Listing 2.
4.3 Further Financial Account-Related Offers and Requests
In addition to credit cards, their corresponding PINs, and CVVs, several other
types of financial account-related information were frequently offered and re-
quested in the underground communication channel we observed. For instance,
in 12.75% of all cases, adversaries advertised login credentials for various ma-
jor national and international banks, e.g., HSBC, Halifax, the Bank of America
(BOA), Chase, and Wells Fargo. Furthermore, attackers frequently offered ac-
cess to numerous compromised online accounts, most importantly to PayPal,
an electronic money transfer service, and Amazon, the world’s leading Internet
retailer [2]. On the other hand, with a share of 1.75% and 1%, respectively, corre-
sponding requests for these goods and services were rarely posted (see Figure 2).
Some sample messages for each category are illustrated in Listing 3.
4.4 Hacking-Related Offers and Requests
In almost one out of seven sample messages, adversaries offered compromised
hosts for sale. These hosts may, for instance, serve as intermediaries for further
attacks and, thus, impede prosecution [11]. Attackers also periodically adver-
tised entire botnets, i.e., larger numbers of penetrated systems under control of
the miscreant (see Listing 4, Line 6). In dependence of its size, a botnet may
potentially cause severe havoc, e.g., by bringing down the network of a business
competitor in the course of a Distributed Denial of Service (DDos) attack [18,22].
Compromised hosts may be used for spamming and phishing campaigns as
well. In the latter case, an attacker first sets up a so-called scam page that mimics
the web site of a legitimate, trusted service provider. In the next step, unaware
computer users are lured into visiting the fraudulent page, typically by sending
specially crafted email messages [30]. The victims are then tricked into entering
their online credentials or other sensitive information that are particularly in-
teresting for Internet miscreants. In 8.75% of the samples, adversaries explicitly
advertised these types of services, the number of corresponding requests was,
however, negligible. In contrast, offers and requests for spam-related operations
were posted almost equally with a share of 9.5% and 7.75%, respectively. An
overview of sample messages for this category is presented in Listing 4.
81 # Adver t i s ements f o r Cash i e r s
"Cashout Usa / UK CC ’s Visa With SSN ONLY!
50:50% Cashout in 2 hours ,
share in Wu / Egold / MoneyBookers PM ME FOR MORE"
6
"CASHING OUT MONEYBOOKERS ACCOUNT. (10.000$/DAILY)"
"I AM LEGIT CASHOUT OF ALL THESE BANK FROM $1 TO $50 ,000
citibank ,hsbc ,natwest ,lloyds ,suntrust ,boa , (...)"
11
"CASHING OUT DUMPS WITH PIN IN USA AT LOCAL ATM ’s
PM ME FOR FAST CASHOUTS FOR YOU !!!!"
"Cashing Dumps + Pins / Fulls + Pins in 40 Mins
16 Msg me For bins List!"
# Adver t i s ements f o r Confirmers
"Confirm Western Union ...PRV ME"
21
"Got Western Union Bug [$265 ,$999 .99]..
It Can Confirm Automatically .."
"CONFIRM MTCN NUMBERS ,MAKE WESTERN UNION ORDER"
26
# Adver t i s ements f o r Drops
"I Got Legit U.S.A Item Drop , Split 50/50"
31 "Got drop for WESTERN UNION on UK LONDON (...) !!!"
"(...) THOSE WHO NEED INDIAN DROP FOR GOODS AND
BANK LOGINS PLS PM ME"
36 "GOT WU DROP ON ANY NAME IN ROMANIA. SERIOUS BUSINESS (...)"
"HAVE CITI BANK KOREA AND CHINA DROPS
THAT CAN TAKE UP $1 ,000 ,000 (...)"
41
# Reques t s f o r Cashiers , Confirmers , and Drops
"I am looking for someone in US that can cashout pins. (...)"
46 "SPAMMER looking for some deals/trustable casheers. !!!"
"I’m looking for a WU confirmer for long term business (...)"
"Looking for a USA/Canada Drop , USA/Canada CVV Cashier (...)"
51
"i need drops from uk (...) pm for deal"
Listing 2: Sample Advertisements and Requests for Cashiers, Confirmers, and
Drops
91 # Adver t i s ements f o r Bank Login and Online Accounts
"Selling Bank ACCOUNT !!!!
big / small ballances US , UK , CA ONLY !!!"
6 "Selling (...) Bank logins with good balance (...)
Contact msn: <...> @hotmail.com ICQ: <...>"
"i Got Few LLoyds Logins with 500 to 1800 Pounds ,
I dont want Cashiers I sell Them Only! Msg me For a Deal."
11
"Selling BOA for 20$ Hurry , Only Few to sell , Accept e-gold"
"I am selling a Verified Paypal account w/ full info! (...)
here is a pic http :// <...>/ ppaccount.jpg - ICQ#: <...>"
16
"Selling (...) ShopAdmins ,Paypalz ,Amazons ,(...) Accept WU!"
"Sells (...) Skype Accounts .. Verified ..
Unverified PayPal Accounts With Mail Access ..
21 Ebay Accounts With Mail Access .."
"Selling steam accounts 5-6-7-8 digits , you tell me which
game you want and I will get it for you. (...)
If I don ’t answer add me on msn: <...> @hotmail.com (...)"
26
# Reques t s f o r Bank Logins and Online Accounts
"(T)rade for PayPal and some bank logins - (...) icq <xxx >"
31
"I am Looking For Paypal Supplier , I can Cash 220 $ from
each verified Paypal Account (...) I’ll send your share
with in 2-3 Hours via e-gold or Western Union (...)"
36 "I NEED PAYPALS ACCOUNTS !!! I HAVE BANK LOGIN AND FULLZ !!!"
"BUYING ALL VERFIED PAYPALS E-GOLD/WEST UNION"
"I need Any Company Account in USA , If you have PM me! (...)"
Listing 3: Sample Advertisements and Requests for Bank Logins and Online
Accounts
10
# Adver t i s ements f o r Hacked Hosts , Spamming Campaigns ,
# and Scams
3
"(S)elling hacked roots:linux ,freeBSD , sunOS; (...)"
"Selling botnets/bots For Reasonable Prices (...)"
8 "Selling Socks of All Countries with Great UpTime. (...)
1 SOCK = 1$, Buy 3 Get 1 For Free (...)!"
"SELL Root ’s, Shells[c99/r57], RDP ’s, VNC ’s, Socks5/Proxy ’s,
Cpanels , Inbox Mailer , Priv8 RFI Scanner! E-Gold Accepted!"
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"Selling (...) Hacking & Injection Tool ’s and Scanners (...)
TEACHING HACKING CLASS! Trades and Deals Welcome!"
"Has Scamms , Hacked hosts , Mails , SSH Scanner , (...)
18 I make Scams upon Request (...)"
# Reques t s f o r Hacked Hosts , Spamming Campaigns , and Scams
23 "I want to buy root ‘s or remote desktop
msg me payment via e-gold"
"NEED REMOTE FROM USA - (...) TRADE FOR ROOT URGENT !"
28 "Selling Fresh 5Million Email List For Spamming"
"i need parmanent spamming host ...i pay egold"
"I AM NEED OF A GOOD HACKER THAT CAN SPAM AND AS WELL DEAL IN
33 OTHER AREA , ANYBODY HERE THAT HAVE AN INBOX PHP MAILER AND I
WILL TRADE WITH 1OFFULLZ"
"I need Scam Page Designer !! Msg me now !!"
Listing 4: Sample Advertisements and Requests for Hacked Hosts, Spamming
Campaigns, and Scams
4.5 Personal Information-Related Offers and Requests
As a supplement to credit cards, miscreants also frequently advertised so-called
fulls, i.e., records of personal data that include the full address of the cardholder,
her phone number as well as her email address. This information may help
miscreants to impersonate (steal) the identity of a victim (see the third example
in Listing 5, Line 7, and McCarty [15]). Samples as the one shown in Listing 6
were periodically posted to the channel, possibly to stimulate demand or prove
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data possession (see also Thomas and Martin [27]). In sum, we identified 12.75%
of the labeled data as advertisements for this category. Surprisingly, however,
this type of asset was requested in less than 1% of all cases.
# Adver t i s ements f o r Persona l Data
"Sell Fresh Full Info & Cvv2 (AU ,CA ,UK ,US ,IT ,SP ,EU) (...)"
4
"Selling (...) Fullz Info -> 20$ each [ICQ for DEAL: <...>]"
"SELLING CANADIAN ID ’S, Be anyone you WANT! (...)"
9 "SELLING ..US-CA-UK FRESH Fulls MMN/SSN/PIN/DOB (...)"
# Reques t s f o r Persona l Data
14 "Need Valid US Cvv2 & Full info (...) Msg.me Ready to Deal
A.S.A.P!!!"
"need ssn/dob , Full info! Paying 100$ via egold ,paypal ,
or wu."
19
"I am interested in buying USA bank logins and FULLZ.
Any legit seller should msg me pronto. Rippers stay off!!"
"BUYING CC FULLZ! WILL BUY 10 FIRST SHOT ,
24 IF SATISFIED , WILL BUY MORE"
Listing 5: Sample Advertisements and Requests for Personal Data
Credit Card Number: 52 xxxx1733xxxx3x
CVV: 761
Expiry Date: 06/10
Name: Eurie <...>
Address: <...> Ave Apt 3
ZIP: <...>
State: Texas
Country: United States
Phone Number: <...>
Email Address: <...>@msn.com
Listing 6: Sanitized Example of a Full Personal Record
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4.6 Equipment-Related Offers and Requests
The hardware equipment which is needed to retrieve credit card-related infor-
mation was also offered for sale in the monitored communication channel. In
particular, attackers advertised so-called skimmers as well as cameras for au-
tomated teller machines (ATMs). With these devices, miscreants are able to
secretly record the PIN number as well as the respective carding data when a
victim withdraws money from her account. The latter may then be processed by
a MSR-206 magnetic card writer to create a new, valid duplicate. Prices for such
a machine varied between $400 and $600 in the channel. Five typical product
advertisements and a request that we have been confronted with in the channel
are shown in Listing 7.
# Adver t i s ements f o r Hardware Equipment
"Selling ATM SKIMMER FULL PACKAGE , included + MSR206
( with all accessories) , video available (...)"
5
"Selling ATM SKIMMER + MSR206 with
5 blank magnetic cards (...)"
"ATM Skimmers , Cameras , MSR206 , Readers , etc. for sale (...)"
10
"Selling MSR -206 for 600 USD dollars shipped to anywhere
in the world. PM ME IF NEEDED."
"Selling (...) ATM Skimmers (S1) with Wireless Camera or
15 PinPad with rechargeable battery 120 hrs (...)"
# Request f o r Hardware Equipment
"LOOKING FOR MSR 206 /MSG FOR MORE INFO."
Listing 7: Sample Advertisements and Requests for Hardware Equipment
5 Market Activity and Market Characteristics
In the course of the observation period, we registered a total of 1,345 different
users, as distinguished by their unique nickname. On an average day, 49 users
were simultaneously logged on and posted at least one message to the channel.
The market was affected by a high fluctuation though: 64.54% of the users left
the channel within 24 hours (see Figure 3). After 7 days, less than 5% of the
participants were still taking part in the actions. A possible reason for this
behavior may, for instance, be that a majority of users either completed their
transactions within a short amount of time or quickly left the channel because
their expectations were not sufficiently met, or alternative channels were more
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promising. On the other hand, a small core of 36 members remained active for
10 days or more, e.g., to intensify business relationships with other Internet
miscreants and maximize their profit margins in the long term (see also Franklin
et al. [6]).
Fig. 3: Percentage of Remaining Users in the Channel after x Days
Apart from the high fluctuation, other prevailing characteristics of the under-
ground market we observed were a high level of uncertainty and, what Franklin
et al. call a “culture of dishonesty and distrust” [6]: Many participants appeared
to be constantly concerned about “getting ripped”, i.e., being conned by other
channel members (see Listing 8). In case a fraudulent operation was detected,
the victim frequently posted a warning message for other users to the channel
(see the last third of Listing 8), and the “ripper” was excluded from the market.
Similar observations were also reported by Thomas and Martin [27]. Franklin
et al. note, however, that these warning messages can also be used against the
underground community to see a “marked decrease in the number of successful
transactions” [6, p. 13]: By defaming and accusing regular sellers of dishonesty,
their respective status can be systematically eliminated. Thereby, quality sellers
increasingly lose their customer base, are unable to maintain their price level,
and are finally forced to cease their trading activity. In the long term, a lemon
market situation is created, i.e., buyers cannot reliably distinguish the quality
of goods and services any longer due to a high degree of uncertainty [8]. As a
consequence, the economy eventually collapses [1]. As Franklin et al. conclude,
this is “a desired outcome” [6, p. 13].
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# Sample Messages from S e l l e r s
"HAVE VIRGIN USA SKIMMED DUMPS FOR SHOPPING (...)
RIPPERS DON ’T WASTE MY TIME!
5 CONTACT ME ONLY IF YOU ’RE FOR REAL."
"CASHING CANADIAN DUMPS , 50/50 Share ,
No Rippers! Serious People Only!"
10 "Selling EU dumps with pin [track1/track2] (...)
NO KIDS ,NO TESTS ,NO RIPPERS ....
IF YOU WASTE MY TIME I WILL IGNORE YOU !!! (...)"
"I Got Legit U.S.A Item Drop ,.... Split 50/50 (...)
15 Serious Drops for Serious Carders.
No0o0o Bull$hit ,Haters , Lamers or Rippers !!!!! (...)"
# Sample Messages from Buyers
20
"SPUNKY_DOG is a ripper stay away from him"
"SPANISHFLY is a ripper don ’t trade with him!"
25 "J0nah and Junkcode , are two ripper , be carefull (...)"
"LeeDevil is ripper avoid him"
Listing 8: Sample Messages Indicating Distrust in Other Market Participants
6 Summary and Future Work
We have monitored a communication channel on an IRC network that was used
for illicit trading activities of stolen credit cards and other transaction- and
personal-related data. We illustrated the different goods and services that are
offered and requested in this branch of the underground economy based on a
number of real world samples. In addition, we outlined major noticeable charac-
teristics of the market and its participants. Our aim was to provide an illustration
of this activity, i.e., a more qualitative description than previous quantitative
studies have given.
To date, research has mainly focused on analyzing the advertisements and
requests for the specific goods and services of the economy. However, there still
seems to be some disagreement about the extent and profitability of the market.
For instance, Symantec estimates the total value of advertised goods to be higher
than $276 million [25]. In contrast, Franklin et al. report a considerably lower
estimated value of about $93 million [6]. Herley and Floreˆncio doubt the correct-
ness of both values and criticize that “there is not a single confirmed instance
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of a sale of illicit goods” documented in previous studies [8, p. 9]. As authors
had lacked to specify the rate of business deals that are actually closing, “[o]ne
cannot estimate the gold in the mountains from the activity at the shovel store”.
We share this opinion and believe that market activity is a poor indicator for
the wealth of the economy, thus, other techniques for studying the underground
economy are necessary.
To impede illicit market transaction, several theories have been discussed but
have not been implemented yet: Franklin et al. propose two simple and elegant
counter-measures based on deceptive accounts and false defamation (see Sec-
tion 5 and Franklin et al. [6]). Ford and Gordon as well as Li et al. present
two approaches to raise the level of uncertainty in malicious botnets, making
these activities economically unviable [5,13]. Similar mechanisms may certainly
be applied to other structures of the underground market, too.
Last but not least, data acquisition techniques must be adapted to cope
with access-restricted channels, too. We have suggested the use of compromised
honeypots as a potential means of gaining access in this situation. Whether this
solution is methodologically sound to systematically infiltrate covert trading
platforms still needs to be examined in more detail in the future though. Thus,
as the arms race continues, the underground market will remain fascinating and
interesting to observe.
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